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This paper draws attention to the translation of ethical norms between the theoretical 
discourses of philosophers and practical discourses in public health. It is suggested that five 
levels can be identified describing categories of a transferral process of ethical norms – a 
process we will refer hereto as “translational ethics”. The aim of the described process is to 
generate understanding regarding how ethical norms come into public health policy 
documents and are eventually referred to in practice. Categorizing several levels can show 
how ethical-philosophical concepts such as norms are transforming in meaning and scope. By 
subdividing the model to five levels, it is suggested that ethical concepts reduce their “content 
thickness” and complexity and trade this in for practicability and potential consensus in 
public health discourses from level to level. The model presented here is illustrated by 
showing how the philosophical-ethical terms “autonomy”, “dignity”, and “justice” are used at 
different levels of the translation process, from Kant’s and Rawls’ theories (level 1) to, in this 
example, WHO reports and communications (levels 4 and 5). A central role is seen for what 
is called “applied ethics” (level 3). 
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There is growing interest in public health 
ethics as a distinct discipline from clinical 
ethics and critical to consideration of 
population health issues (1). As 
highlighted by Michael Marmot there is an 
urgent need to create better understanding 
between philosophers, the health 
community and the real world (2). He has 
lamented, at times, the contemptuous 
approach of some philosophers, not 
considering real life concerns and not 
engaging with non-philosophers. These 
philosophers are often engaged in highly 
theoretical discussions, even in 
multidisciplinary gatherings. Such issues 
are relevant since public health prides 
itself in evidence based knowledge and 
there is a question as to why evidence 
often does not translate into public health 
practice. It has been suggested that 
evidence is generated within a deliberate 
exchange process between scientists and 
practitioners, and that it is essential to take 
values, resources and interests of the 
different parties into account (3). 
Consequently, consideration of ethical 
norms and values should be seen asa 
critical part of the translation process (4). 
This is more than just linking the 
philosophical ivory tower approach of 
academics with the practical world of 
practitioners but rather also appreciating 
the language, purpose and nature of 
philosophy and public health, and their 
essential roles for effective scholarship and 
practice. 
To give an example, ethical norms, such as 
“autonomy” and “justice”, are often 
mentioned in public health policy and 
practice discourses. When these normative 
concepts are used, public health 
practitioners probably understand them 
differently to – but not necessarily 
incompatibly with – philosophers. This 
presumed discrepancy leads to the 
question: How can one relate the ethical 
concepts in practice to their philosophical 
background theories? This paper provides 
a description of the potential pathway 
between the ivory tower and practice using 
case studies of some specific conceptual 
issues used in theoretical, policy and 
practical discourses. 
 
Translation and Transferral 
In medicine the term “translational 
research” or “translational medicine” is 
well established, generally referring to the 
translation of scientific research to clinical 
practice, a process often called “from 
bench to bedside” [e.g. (5)]. However, 
translation of knowledge does not only 
take place in sciences and medicine. 
Ethical concepts also undergo a 
translation– from philosophical theory to, 
in this example, public health policy and 
practice. In the following discussion we 
focus on the translation of philosophical 
work into public health practice. 
The term “translational ethics” is relatively 
new. Even though ethical concepts are 
frequently “transferred” or “translated” – 
both etymologically meaning “to carry 
over” –between and across different 
domains, there is scarce academic 
scholarship regarding the issue (6-
8).Unlike language translation it is not the 
name of the concept that is translated, but 
its specific content that is made applicable 
for practice: the meaning and scope of 
philosophical concepts is explained and 
made usable for – or “carried over” to – 
contexts of professional practice in a 
process that we can term “translation”. The 
metaphor “translation” is also used as a 
reference for other areas of “translational 
research”, as mentioned above, when one 
refers to the transferral of basic scientific 
knowledge (the laboratory “bench”) to the 
more applicable and practical use of the 
knowledge (the clinical practice at the 
“bedside”). In this discourse, however, the 
concepts sometimes change in scope and 
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meaning so that we consider the term 
“translation” to be appropriate. This 
translational process is by no means meant 
to be a one-way street (6). Indeed practical 
discourses can initiate or inform 
developments in philosophical theory as 
well. However, in this paper – as a starting 
point – we focus on the translation of 




To give an example of the translational 
process, the concepts “autonomy” and 
“dignity”shall be mentioned. These 
concepts have been philosophically 
elaborated upon by the renowned 
eighteenth century philosopherImmanuel 
Kant. However, for him these concepts had 
a different meaningthan they do for the 
public health practitioner who is, for 
example, considering the autonomy or 
dignity of a child and her parents who 
refuse immunization.Even without 
knowingthe precise philosophical aspects 
of the concept of “autonomy”, at least 
through common, everyday or professional 
language, the physician possessesa 
normative understandingof the concept 
that usually derives from Kant’s (and 
others’) conception of it.A normative 
appreciation of autonomymay lead the 
physician to accept a patient’s decision. 
Another example is how public health 
practitioners formulatein the context of 
childhood immunization that “[…] the 
impulse to maximize benefit for the 
highestnumber of people is 
counterbalanced by the Kantian threshold 
of a categorical imperative […] that 
preserves individual autonomy and 
emphasizes ideas such as informed 
consent” (9).However, this formulated 
Kantian “side constraint” may not be 
asreadily accepted bya more theoretically 
informed philosophical argumentation, 
such as that offered by thephilosopher and 
Kant scholar Onora O’Neill. In her 
argumentation, Kantian autonomy 
mayeven put moral obligations on parents 
to have their child immunized for the sake 
of protecting the autonomy of others (10). 
This is not to say – and not the question of 
this paper – that either Salmon and Omer 
or O’Neill are right in the interpretation of 
Kant.It is to demonstrate that the 
understanding of both is significantly 
different even though both relate back to 
Kant.  
Indeed, autonomy is an ethical concept 
with a long standing philosophical 
tradition and strong and “content 
thick”background theories from which it 
has evolved (11). “Content thick” 
meansthe involvement of sophisticated 
philosophical substantiation and 
differentiation, perhaps including explicit 
consideration of other philosophical fields, 
such as from epistemology or 
metaphysics.Nevertheless, a public health 
practitioner is not (necessarily) aware of 
ethical theories behind this term when 
using it, even if he or she refers back to 
Kant explicitly, as the example of Salmon 
and Olmer (9) – who claim that Kantian 
autonomy is incompatible with involuntary 
immunization – shows.So, how does the 
practitioner come to use an ethical 
concept?  
It is the thesis of this paper that ethical 
concepts move from the 
“philosophicalivory tower” to – in this 
case– public health “practice” 
(includingpolicy making and research). 
This happens while practitioners have, or 
display, only common knowledge of the 
philosophical backgrounds of the ethical 
concepts they are normatively applying.  
Thus we suggest that if we could 
reconstruct the patterns of translation of 
meaning of the term “autonomy” from 
Kant to the practitioners’ use of this 
concept, we could help to facilitate 
communication among the stakeholders 
involved in the normative elaboration and 
development of public health. The aim of 
this paper is thus to propose a heuristic 
model for discussion and to stimulate 
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scholarship on the translation of ethical 
terms for practice.  
 
Towards a Heuristic Model 
The development of such a model draws 
on some assumptions of the philosophy 
and sociology of science in the tradition of 
Thomas Kuhn (12) and Ludwik Fleck (13). 
The concept held in common among these 
authors and underpinning the 
proposedmodel is that scientists and 
practitioners live and act in their respective 
paradigms and communities, which are 
partly constituent by their use of language. 
Thus, for members of one community to 
understand members of other 
communities, care needs to be taken to 
ensure that their lexicon is the same. 
Moreover, concepts should be made 
commensurable – meaning that the sense 
of a common concept or term is 
comparable in different discourses. 
However, this is not easy since the 
extension of concepts and their meanings 
can change. The model proposed here 
raises awareness of this challenge.  
The “content thickness” of elaborated 
philosophical concepts is relevant for 
practice, for example, to achieve a 
differentiated and critical understanding of 
terms,similarly “content-thinness” has 
some virtues. “Content thin” conceptsare 
more acceptable in pluralistic societies and 
policy making (because the concept could 
derive from and stand for many 
background theories and worldviews). 
Practitioners can agree on the normative 
concept first – and then elaborate upon 
what this means exactlyby referring back 
to elaborations and theories of earlier 
levels of the translational process. It is the 
assumption of the model proposed here 
that normative concepts have legitimacy 
and specific roles in each of these 
communities – be it in the philosophical 
ivory tower or in practice. Yet, when 
“carrying over” or “handing over” the 
normative concept like a baton, even 
though the concept still looks the same, its 
meaning has often changed.  
 
A Heuristic and Descriptive Model of 
Translational Ethics 
The proposed model consists offivelevels. 
Theselevels range – analogous to the 
concept of “from bench to bedside” – from 
the philosophical ivory tower (Level One) 
to public health practice (LevelsFour and 
Five).Normative concepts such as ethical 
principlesarecomplex and “content thick” 
on a philosophical level and, in practice, 
are more “content thin”. Thus, the model 
focuses upon the transformative journey 
thatethical conceptsmake from the ivory 
tower to practice.  
In the following section wedescribe the 
differentlevels of the model by using 
different examples: the strongly related 
concepts of autonomy, dignity, and justice 
and specifications of these.We illustrate 
levels 4 and 5 using the example of the 
WHO report on “Health Systems 
Performance” from 2000 (14). 
 
Level One: Abstract and ideal 
philosophical theory 
The firstlevelof the model refers to 
philosophical works that are often the 
foundation for normative ethical concepts. 
Using the examples of autonomy, dignity 
and justice,one can refer to the works of 
Immanuel Kant. In his discussion of these 
concepts, Kant already uses examples, 
such as the murderer at the door to whom 
one may not lie, even to protect an 
innocent friend– yet, they remain very 
abstract, often counterintuitive in the 
modern world. Kant’s discussions would 
be too abstract and somewhat 
unconvincing if one were to apply them 
directly to public health 
practice.Furthermore, he also 
includescomplex and controversial 
metaphysical conceptsin his 
argumentation– such as the claim that a 
person as “homo noumenon” bears human 
dignity(15) –that are unsuitable for public 
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health practices, as we have argued 
elsewhere(16). In fact, theories at this level 
often integrate a rich and wide scholarship 
of other areas of philosophy – including 
ontology, epistemology and metaphysics. 
John Rawls (in 1971)in his theory of 
justice as fairness(17),has also drawn on 
Kant’s insights. Rawls’ theoryalso remains 
abstract in many regards, for instancedue 
to his use of hypothetical models such as 
the contractarian approach to justify his 
concept of justice and the difficulties 
associated with the applicability of the 
concept to everyday concrete problems. In 
fact, Rawls’ accounthas been consideredan 
“ideal” theory (18).Thus, we would 
consider this level as representing ideal 
theory; meaning that it abstracts from 
concrete real-world practice and conditions 
(7, p. 210). Similarly,Rawls is criticized by 
Amartya Sen for dealing with the design of 
“ideal” institutions (19, p. 15ff), as 
opposedto institutions that function in the 
real-world.Marmot has highlighted that 
non-philosophers are not familiar with 
complex philosophical concepts and that 
many think that “Rawls were to do with 
building sites” (2), given that the British 
English word for “screw anchor” is 
“rawlplug”. 
 
Level Two: Non-ideal theory for a field 
of practice  
The secondlevel covers ethical theories 
that are already more concretewith regard 
to the field of practicein question,and are 
developed based on empiric knowledge of 
that setting. Theorists build a theory for a 
concrete context referringto and basing it 
on Level One theories such as Rawls and 
Kant. Theorists from this level include 
figures such ashealth justice theorist 
Norman Danielswho developed a theory 
based on Rawls’ basic ideas (20);or the 
philosopher Madison Powers and the 
bioethicist and public health researcher 
Ruth Faden,with their work on social 
justice (21). While developing, in their 
view, a sound theory of health justice, they 
also claim to develop a decided non-ideal 
theory.Powers and Faden (21) criticize 
Rawls’assumption of equality of persons 
in a hypothetical situation. Instead, they 
look at real worldinequalities and work on 
criteria of why these inequalities matter. 
However, without Rawls’ ideal theory of 
justice (and indirectlyKant’s concept of 
dignity) their own theory would probably 
not have been developed. Despite this very 
theoretical difference betweenLevelsOne 
and Two, the intention to be more practical 
onLevelTwo and to try to deliver real 
world solutions for public health makes a 
significant difference. Yet, both Daniels 
and Powers and Fadens’ theoretical 
approaches, explicitly draw on Level One 
theories, criticize them and dialectically 
develop their own, more 
accessible,LevelTwo theories for 
philosophers and practitioners. 
Level Twoacademic scholarship is often 
made more practical by collaborations 
between philosophers and public health 
scientists (e.g. Daniels, Kennedy and 
Kawachi(22), Powers and Faden(21)). On 
LevelTwo,interdisciplinary perspectives 
and collaboration becomemore relevant. 
Here, the aim is, as O’Neill formulates it 
(23), to give more ethical substantial input 
to applied ethical debates,leading us to the 
next level. 
 
Level Three: Applied ethics 
LevelThreerepresents what is often called 
“applied ethics”,meaning that concepts and 
theories fromprevious levels are 
“applied”to concrete practical problems to 
receive normative guidance – but this is 
also an area where normative convictions 
and judgements could be inductively 
connected to ethical theory. Level Three 
discourses are often initiated 
bypractitioners. They look for 
interdisciplinary discourses with ethicists 
to find criteria or even solutions to moral 
questions. Public health practitioners at 
this level are positive about the powers 
(and limits) of philosophical ethics, as they 
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are often already ethically informed or 
educated.  
Ethicists, when working on these issues – 
often in interdisciplinary teams or even 
commissions, like the Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics and its report on public health 
ethics (24) – try to use generally 
understandable references of ethical 
theories. At Level Three the works of 
applied ethics such as the influential work 
of philosophers Beauchamp and Childress 
(25)is very prevalent. In their four-
principle approach for biomedical ethics, 
they also refer to “autonomy” and 
“justice”. Beauchamp and Childress 
explain the background concepts of their 
principles such as “autonomy” and” 
justice” – making reference toLevelTwo 
andLevelOne theoriesand approaches. In 
the context of “autonomy” for instance, 
they combine Kantian ideasof autonomy 
and the related concept of dignity with 
other relevant philosophies (most 
notablythe related concept of “liberty” of 
John Stuart Mill). Yet, they explain this 
overlap so broadly and generally that 
practitioners can understand and apply the 
principles. This might mean a loss of 
theoretical complexity and content 
thickness (even though Beauchamp and 
Childress would argue that they have a 
unifying background theory of 
coherentism and might claim their work to 
be on Level Two).For the sake of being 
interdisciplinary, pluralistically 
communicable, agreeable and helpful as 
tools and criteria for decision making this 
is understandable and in fact very 
helpful.Of course, as the example of 
Beauchamp and Childress shows, 
philosophers can work on different levels 
and levels should not be identified with 
persons. A good example is philosophers 
who engage in Level One scholarship but 
also write on applied ethics or work in 
interdisciplinary ethics commissions (such 
as e.g. Tom Beauchamp, a renowned 
Hume scholar).  
 
Level Four: Applied ethics in practice  
The normative concepts used at Level 
Fourmainlyrefer to literature 
fromLevelThree. Authors of arguments 
using the terms “respect for dignity” or 
“autonomy” refer to the works oftheorists 
such asBeauchamp and Childress. They 
understand these terms rudimentarily(in a 
philosophical sense). They are not (as) 
aware ofthe background theories. In this 
translation processthe “content thickness” 
and depth of the norms are further lost, yet, 
these criteria help to make normative 
arguments around the acceptability of 
public health interventions. 
Representatives of theselevels would be 
public health researchers or practitioners 
aware of moral problems. They are also 
aware of these being norms and concepts 
coming from a rich ethical discourse. 
Normative tools – including codes of 
conduct – that are established to guide 
practical conduct (1) arguably also belong 
to this level, or between LevelsThree and 
Four. 
The example weuse to explain this level 
andLevelFive is the use of ethical norms in 
a framework for health systems 
performance assessment developed for and 
used by the World Health Organization. 
The initial framework was developed by 
Christopher Murray and Julio Frenk and 
was improved and adopted for use in “The 
World Health Report 2000”. 
With their framework for health systems 
performance assessment, Murray and 
Frenkaim to advise decision makers 
(26,27). In other words, their work should 
be of very practical use. Within their 
framework, they formulate “health system 
goals”. The main goals are “health”, 
“responsiveness” and “fair financing and 
financial risk protection”. These goals are 
to be measured in health systems 
performance and efficiency assessments. 
“Responsiveness”has two dimensions. The 
second one is “client orientation”, the first 
one, upon which we focus, is “respect for 
persons”. Of the several sub-components, 
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the first three explicitly use ethical norms 
and can be closely related to the 
philosophy of autonomy and dignity: 
“Respect for the dignity of the person” as 
the first sub-component forbids 
instrumentalisation of persons. As they 
formulate, it is important to show “respect 
for the autonomy of the individual to make 
choices about his/her own health. 
Individuals, when competent, or their 
agents, should have the right to choose 
what interventions they do and do not 
receive” (26).They further talk of“respect 
for confidentiality” (26). In referring to 
these ethical norms and applying them to 
their context, Murray and Frenkformulate 
precisely in the language of applied ethics 
and refer to 18 sources, many of which are 
works in applied ethics (Level Three), 
including Beauchamp and Childress.  
The third goal “fair financing and financial 
risk protection” makes explicit reference to 
the concept of fairness (related to the 
concept of justice). Here they reference 
work by the philosopher Daniels and 
colleagues where they apply his theory to 
concrete health care issues (28). Here 
again it can be seen that normative 
arguments are clearly made, using ethical 
norms without going back to “content 
thick” theories of Level One. 
 
Level 5: Reference to ethical-normative 
concepts in practice 
On the final level, practitionersuse ethical 
concepts as normative terms without 
making any reference to theories of ethics 
or applied ethics (Levels One -Three). No 
explicit elaboration of the normative 
conceptscan be found at LevelFour.At this 
pointthese concepts haveonly a 
rudimentary link with the concepts 
ofLevels One and Two.Nevertheless a 
certain normative essence is encapsulated.  
To illustrate this, we look at how “The 
World Health Report 2000” was further 
condensed and “translated” for practice 
and the public by an accompanying 
message from the former WHO Director 
General, Gro Harlem Brundtland,and by 
the press release of the WHO. Gro Harlem 
Brundtland’s statementopens the report as 
a “Message from the Director-General”. 
Brundtland starts by asking two (of three) 
questions relating explicitly to ethical 
concepts “What makes for a good health 
system? What makes a health system 
fair?” She continues by saying that it is the 
task of the WHO and of such a report to 
help all stakeholders “to reach a balanced 
judgment” (29, p. vii). Moreover,she 
makes reference to values and norms we 
are already familiar with from Level Four, 
the framework paper by Murray and Frenk 
(26). She continues with stating the 
ethically relevant part: The goals of health 
systems “are concerned with fairness in the 
way people pay for health care, and with 
how systems respond to people’s 
expectations with regard to how they are 
treated. Where health and responsiveness 
are concerned, achieving a high average 
level is not good enough: the goals of a 
health system must also include reducing 
inequalities in ways that improve the 
situation of the worst-off.” According to 
these (normative, ethics based) 
considerations, health system performance 
is measured to give policy-makers 
information to act on.  
Additionally, the translational function of 
journalismis considered by formulating a 
press release. In this press release, there 
are direct quotes by the Director General 
but also by Murray, Frenk and others. The 
press release additionally refers to the 
ethical concepts and norms. It mentions 
“injustice” and treating with “respect”. 
However, it also refers to the main 
categories and components of the 
performance index “responsiveness” and 
“fairness of financial contribution”. The 
aspect of “responsiveness” based on the 
ethical norms is now concisely 
summarized as “respect for persons 
(including dignity, confidentiality and 
autonomy of individuals and families to 
decide about their own health)”. In the 
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press – e.g. in the New York Times (30)– 
the ethical concepts areeven less prevalent. 
Formerly used foundational norms such as 
“respect” and “dignity”are not usedany 
longer, only the term “fairness” related to 
the measurements. In other words, the 
explicit ethical norms are even further in 
the background. Yet, one could trace 
“fairness” back – translated through the 
levels – to Rawls’ Level One explication.  
 
Discussion 
Philosophers often develop their normative 
concepts and ideal theories without 
considering real world practice. Public 
health practitioners, on the other hand, 
often refer to normative ethical concepts 
without explaining their specific meaning 
or referring to underlying ethical theories 
(and possible normative ambiguities). In 
many cases,practitioners use these norms 
because they are “common sense” or 
belong to the “common morality”, yet, in 
their normative explication they can 
generally be traced back to philosophical 
theories that substantiate the norms’ 
normative content. This paper explores 
how these norms make their way into the 
language of practitioners (e.g. health 
policy documents). It is the thesis of this 
paper that there is a translational process in 
the background through which the norms 
in practices are alsoconnected to 
(underlying, foundational) ethical theories. 
The paper proposes a model with several 
levelshighlighting how this translational 
process occurs. The model is intended 
toheuristically describe how ethical norms 
are used (and translated) between 
scholarship (Levels One – Three) and 
practice (LevelsFour and Five).  
Whereas in public health the use of 
schematic models is widely accepted, even 
though models are always a simplification 
and models like the ‘policy action cycle’ 
are by no means meant to be exhaustive or 
static, this seems less common in ethics. 
We are aware that the differentiation 
between the levels can be debated and 
concepts like “applied ethics” are 
contested in philosophy, yet we deem such 
a model a heuristic starting point for 
discourses aiming to better connect 
philosophical theory to public health 
practice. In this model we observe what 
we call the inverse relationship thesis 
which is visualized in Figure 1. On the one 
side (on Level One), there is content 
thickness and complex original 
philosophical thought with regard to 
theory building in the foreground. On the 
other side (Levels Four and Five) there is 
public health practice. Here the content 
thickness and complexityof the normative 
concepts proportionally decreaseswhile 
there is an increase of applicability and 
suitability for practice. In other words, we 
formulate the thesis that there is an inverse 
relationship between content thicknesses 
and practicability.In public health practice 
there are also often inherent unsaid value 
judgements which are made around 
content “thickness” and “thinness” and 
their suitability to practice and the issue of 
practice is important in terms of generating 
knowledge and interdisciplinary research 
and practice. 
The developed model has several 
limitations that point in the direction of a 
need for further scholarship and 
development on this topic. The five levels 
have blurred boundaries and partly overlap 
(for example, the rich work of Beauchamp 
and Childress could be considered to be 
bothLevel Two and Three). Demarcations 
between these categories and levels are 
difficult to set. In fact, one could argue that 
there could be more or fewer categories 
and one would probably also find good 
reasons for these changes. Having five 
levels, however, also makes visible the 
central role of applied ethics as an 
intermediary and interface between the 
academic and the practical world. We 
believe that such a model helps raising 
awareness that different discourses on 
ethical norms are taking place and that a 
“translation” process exists. Awareness of 
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this process is important to improve 
communication and ultimately to elaborate 
better arguments, consequently also 
improving public health practice. 
 
Figure 1. The translational process of ethical norms: The relation of content thickness 





Lastly, we have suggested that there is a 
linear, top-down direction of travel from 
Level One to Level Five. Despite this not 
(necessarily or always) being a linear 
process – where levels can be jumped or 
individuals can work on several levels at 
the same time – the process works in 
several directions (6,31). It can work its 
way backwards – more practical levels 
inspiring more philosophical levels. And, 
of course, practical levels can request from 
multiple philosophical levels to reflect on 
implications of the use and meaning of 
normative concepts. For instance, 
discussions on the concept of autonomy in 
the philosophical levels can be prompted 
and inspired by problems arising on the 
work floor in the practical levels. To 
illustrate, certain groups can be 
encountered to whom autonomy and 
informed consent cannot be readily 
applied, such as young children or patients 
with Alzheimer`s disease. In such cases, it 
can be helpful to have discussions in the 
philosophical levels on the meaning and 




There seem to be transferral or 
transformative processes, here referred to 
as translational processes, of ethical 
concepts from the “philosophical ivory 
tower” to public health practice – and vice 
versa. The model presented here describes 
that a norm reducesphilosophical-
theoretical “contentthickness”and 
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practice and, in the other direction, that 
norms from practice are connected to 
ethical theories. Awareness of these 
translational processes can ultimately help 
to improve the moral foundation of public 
health practice and critically inform 
practice of norms and values. More 
research would be helpful to validate this 
model, identify and discuss more examples 
of translational ethics as modelled here,and 
to investigate the relationships between the 
differentlevels.Furthermore, attention 
needs to be given to the practical 
consequences of our model. 
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